\u3cem\u3eWells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.\u3c/em\u3e: A Potential Beginning of The End of The Objective Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense by Cantley, Beckett G & Dietrich, Geoffrey C
University of Miami Business Law Review 
Volume 29 Issue 1 Article 3 
August 2021 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.: A Potential Beginning of The End of The 
Objective Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense 
Beckett G. Cantley 
Northeastern University 
Geoffrey C. Dietrich 
Cantley Dietrich, P.C. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Beckett G. Cantley and Geoffrey C. Dietrich, Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.: A Potential Beginning of The End of 
The Objective Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense, 29 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2021) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol29/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an 




Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S.: A Potential 
Beginning of The End of The Objective 
Reasonable Basis Tax Penalty Defense 
Beckett G. Cantley1 
Geoffrey C. Dietrich2 
 
I. OVERVIEW .......................................................................................... 1 
II. THE STATUTORY REASONABLE BASIS DEFENSE ............................... 3 
III. CASE LAW APPLYING AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD ............................. 6 
A. Cases Applying Objective Standard Upholding Negligence ........ 6 
B. Cases Applying Reasonable Basis Finding No Negligence ......... 9 
C. Cases Applying Reasonable Basis with Reliance 
Component .................................................................................. 10 
D. The Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States Case ........................... 12 
1. Facts ...................................................................................... 12 
2. The Holding on the Tax ........................................................ 13 
3. The Holding on the Penalty .................................................. 14 
4. The Dissent ........................................................................... 15 
V. ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 17 
A. Post-Decision Application .......................................................... 17 
B. Is the Holding Correct? .............................................................. 18 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 20 
 
I. OVERVIEW 
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 6662(a) permits the IRS to 
impose a twenty-percent (20%) accuracy-related penalty to an 
underpayment of tax, and there are several different defenses to this 
 
1 Prof. Beckett G. Cantley teaches International Taxation at Northeastern University 
and is a shareholder in Cantley Dietrich, P.C. Prof. Cantley would like to thank Melissa 
Cantley and his law clerk, Austin Schley, for their contributions to this article. 
2 Geoffrey C. Dietrich, Esq. is a shareholder in Cantley Dietrich, P.C. 
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penalty depending on the facts of the case and the reason for the penalty.3  
One of the most common accuracy-related penalties is the negligence 
penalty.4 Although there are multiple different reasons for the application 
of an accuracy-related penalty, only one penalty may be applied for each 
understatement.5  If a taxpayer faces the negligence penalty, one common 
defense is that the taxpayer’s return position has a reasonable basis under 
the relevant authorities.6  Until recently, most courts simply proceeded 
through a discussion on whether the authorities supported the taxpayer’s 
return position, and did not even reach whether the taxpayer actually relied 
on relevant authorities when forming a return position.7  However, over 
the past few years, several courts have begun to require a subjective actual 
reliance component to the reasonable basis standard, in addition to the 
other requirements described under the regulations.8 
This article explores these concepts more in detail in six parts. Part II 
introduces the statutory reasonable basis defense, reviewing the applicable 
regulations9 and the circumstances when the negligence penalty is 
applied.10 Next, Part III introduces prior case law analyzing the reasonable 
basis defense, ranging from cases applying a more objective reasonable 
basis defense, and several courts applying a subjective11 component to the 
 
3 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a): See MARTIN L. FRIED, 2 TAXATION OF SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 
§ 34.02 (No. 82, 2020)(Provides a table showing the penalty percentages for the other 
accuracy-related penalties). 
4 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c). 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b) lists the reasons under which the IRS can 
apply an accuracy related penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6662. The reasons include negligence 
or disregard of rules or regulations, any substantial understatement of income tax, any 
substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1, any substantial overstatement of 
pension liabilities, any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement, and any 
disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance 
(within the meaning of section 7701 (o)) or failing to meet the requirements of any similar 
rule of law. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b). 
5 Smoker v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-56, at *18 (2013)(citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-
2(c). 
6 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(B)(ii)(II); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3). 
7 See e.g. Pederson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-54, at *58–59 (2013); TIFD III-E 
Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp.3d 142, 148-52 (D. Conn. 2014); Taibo v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2004-196, at *7 (2004); Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC, v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2020-54, at *43 (2020). 
8 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States., No. 17-3578, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13279 
(8th Cir. Apr. 24, 2020); Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States., No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *29 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2016); Blue Mt. Energy v. 
United.States., 418 F. Supp.3d 901, 908 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 2019). 
9 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(iii). 
10 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c). 
11 Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-3578, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13279, at *23–33; Blue Mt. 
Energy, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *29; Blue Mt. 
Energy, 418 F. Supp.3d at 908. 
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reasonable basis defense. Until recently, many courts did not examine 
whether a taxpayer actually relied on the authorities listed to support its 
position, but instead looked to if the taxpayer’s return position was 
objectively supported by the relevant authorities. Part IV examines Wells 
Fargo & Co. v. United States in detail including the facts of the case, the 
holding on the tax in which the court struck down Wells Fargo’s STARS 
transaction12, and the court’s reasoning that actual reliance is required as 
part of the reasonable basis defense.13 The court looked at the broader 
statutory and case law framework, as well as the definition of “base,” and 
determined the reasonable basis standard also required a subjective actual 
reliance component.14 Further, the court determined that a part of the 
STARS transaction did not have any purpose other than tax savings.15 Part 
V examines how other courts may view this holding going forward and 
discusses how the majority incorrectly concluded that under the 
reasonable basis defense a taxpayer’s return position must not only be 
supported by one or more relevevant authorities, but the taxpayer must 
also rely on those authorities when contemplating tax decisions.16 In 
circuits requiring an actual reliance on one or more relevant authorities, 
taxpayers must document or be able to show that they actually relied on 
the authorities cited in support of their case, and the return position cannot 
be a position taken after the return is filed to support the return position. 
Lastly, Part VI provides an overview of the conclusions reached in this 
article. 
II. THE STATUTORY REASONABLE BASIS DEFENSE 
Under IRC § 6662(a), the IRS may impose an accuracy-related 
penalty on “an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the portion of the 
underpayment on which this section applies.”17  The negligence penalty is 
one of the more common accuracy-related penalties a taxpayer faces and, 
by statute, may assert reasonable basis as a defense.18 Under IRC 
§ 6662(c), negligence is defined as “any failure to make a reasonable 
attempt to comply with the provisions of this title.”19  Regulations describe 
negligence as “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with 
the provisions of the internal revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and 
 
12 Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-3578, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13279, at *15–25. 
13 Id. at *25–33. 
14 See id. 
15 Id. at *17–23. 
16 Id. 
17 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a). 
18 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(B)(ii)(II). 
19 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c). 
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reasonable care.”20 The regulations continue to define the boundaries of 
taxpayer negligence to include “any failure by the taxpayer to keep 
adequate books and records or to substantiate properly.”21 While codified, 
case law demonstrates that courts are unlikely to apply the negligence 
penalty where the “issue to be resolved by the Court is one of first 
impression involving unclear statutory language.”22 
In Mortensen v. Comm’r, the Sixth Circuit noted that the burden is on 
the taxpayer to prove that they did not act negligently in preparing their 
tax return and that the Commissioner’s choice to apply the penalty is 
“presumptively correct.”23 The Sixth Circuit then curtailed this broad 
statement by stating that “[a] taxpayer is not required to be perfect for this 
would be an unrealistic expectation.”24 The court continued, “[r]easonable 
minds can differ over tax reporting and sometimes the IRS disallows 
certain transactions.”25  Thus, the Sixth Circuit recognized navigating tax 
issues can be complicated, and simply because the taxpayer and the IRS 
do not interpret the IRC in the same manner does not mean that the 
taxpayer is always negligent.26  However, in this case, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that the taxpayer did not “do what a reasonable and ordinarily 
prudent person would do under the circumstances”27 because the taxpayer 
should have noticed, among other issues, that large tax losses were “too 
good to be true.”28 
Juxtaposed with the court’s willingness to view the Commissioner’s 
imposition of penalties as “presumptively correct,” is the language of 
Treasury Regulations stating, “[a] return position that has a reasonable 
basis as defined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section is not attributable to 
negligence.”29 As such, a taxpayer that can support their return position 
with one or more relevant authorities will not be liable for negligence as 
an accuracy-related penalty.30 The reasonable basis standard is defined as 
being “a relatively high standard of tax reporting,” and the reasonable 
 
20 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b). 
21 Id. 
22 Lemishow v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 110, 114 (1998) (citing Hitchins v. Comm’r, 103 
T.C. 711, 720 (1994). 
23 Mortensen v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 2006). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. (quoting Leuhsler v. Comm’r., 963 F.2d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
28 Id. at 386; see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(ii) (2019) (“Negligence is strongly indicated 
where . . . [a] taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a 
deduction, credit or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent 
person to be ‘too good to be true’ under the circumstances . . . “). 
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b); 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c)(2)(B)(ii)(II). 
30 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b); 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). 
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basis standard will not be met by “a return position that is merely arguable 
or that is merely a colorable claim.”31 There are five legal standards that 
might apply that the taxpayer must overcome to escape the penalty.32 In 
order from most to least stringent, the standards are: more likely than not; 
substantial authority; realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits; 
reasonable basis; and not frivolous.33 To gain a better understanding of 
reasonable basis, “though the Regulations do not assign a numerical 
probability of success that a reasonable basis position must equal or 
exceed, the standard is generally regarded as satisfied if the taxpayer has 
at least a one in five (or 20%) chance of prevailing . . . on the merits.”34 
Although this percentage is not a codified  rule, it provides the taxpayer 
with a comparative view to how the courts view the different legal 
standards.35 Accordingly, reasonable basis, as it requires a much lower 
threshold, should be the more easily met standard for the courts view of 
the taxpayer’s return position.36 
 As additional support for a lower threshold for the reasonable 
basis standard in court, the regulation offers up that “[i]f a return position 
is reasonable based on one or more of the authorities set forth in § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(iii)(taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness of the 
authorities, and subsequent developments), the return position will 
generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard even though it may not 
satisfy the substantial authority standard . . . .”37 The different authorities 
listed under 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) open up a cornucopia of 
authorities that include case law, the Internal Revenue Code, and the 
regulations.38 The regulation limits relevant authority under this section 
and excludes “[c]onclusions reached in treatises, legal periodicals, legal 
opinions or opinions rendered by tax professionals.”39  Although these 
 
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3). 
32 See Stuart E. Seigel & Joy Taylor, It’s a New Ballgame - Rules to Practice by, 51 
MAJOR TAX PLAN. 14-1, 14-35–40 (1999). 
33 Id. 
34 FRIED, supra note 3. 
35 Seigel & Taylor, supra note 32 (“The most stringent ‘more likely than not’ standard 
is similar to the preponderance of the evidence standard, requiring a finding that there is 
more than a 50-percent likelihood that the position taken for an item is proper.”). 
36 See id. 
37 Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2019) describes the substantial standard as “an 
objective standard involving an analysis of the law and application of the law to relevant 
facts.” Further, “Because the substantial authority standard is an objective standard, the 
taxpayer’s belief that there is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item is not 
relevant in determining whether there is substantial authority for that treatment.” Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i). The substantial authority standard is more stringent than the 
reasonable basis standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2). 
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). 
39 Id. 
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authorities may not constitute relevant authority, “[t]he authorities 
underlying such expressions of opinion where applicable to the facts of a 
particular case, however, may give rise to substantial authority for the tax 
treatment of an item.”40 Thus, a taxpayer may rely on the advice of a tax 
professional if the tax professional’s opinion is derived from relevant 
authorities.41 As a final bone thrown to the taxpayer facing penalties, if a 
return position is not reasonably based in the relevant authorities, the 
reasonable cause and good faith defense may be available to the 
taxpayer.42 
III. CASE LAW APPLYING AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD 
A. Cases Applying Objective Standard Upholding Negligence 
In Fidelity Intern. Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, v. United States., 
the court imposed the negligence penalty, but specifically noted the 
“negligence standard is an objective one, requiring a “lack of due care or 
the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do under 
similar circumstances.”43 The court recognized when examining whether 
the accuracy-related penalty for negligence was correctly applied, the 
court would view the actions of the taxpayer objectively.44 Although not 
discussing reasonable basis, the court viewed the underlying reason for the 
penalty (negligence) objectively, which arguably shows that reasonable 
basis should also be viewed objectively considering that reasonable basis 
serves as a defense to the negligence penalty.45 
In Bunney v. Comm’r., the Tax Court found the taxpayer liable in part 
for the negligence penalty but determined there was a reasonable basis for 
a position on an issue which had not been addressed previously by the 
court.46 Here, the court noted “[a] return position that is ‘arguable, but 
fairly unlikely to prevail in court’ satisfies the reasonable basis 
standard.”‘47 This statement further supports the notion that to be 
 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Treas. Reg. §1.6662-3(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (“No penalty may be 
imposed under section 6662 with respect to any portion of an underpayment upon a 
showing by the taxpayer that there was a reasonable cause for, and the taxpayer acted in 
good faith with respect to, such portion.”). 
43 Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. 
Mass. 2010). 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 Bunney v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 259, 267 (2000). 
47 Id. at 266. 
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successful under the reasonable basis standard, a taxpayer’s return position 
need to be only around twenty percent (20%) likely to be successful on its 
merits.48 In items the taxpayer conceded, the court found the taxpayer was 
liable for the negligence penalty and did not accept the defense that the 
return was complicated and the taxpayer had used a tax program in 
completing the return.49 However, even though the court found the text of 
the disputed Code section to be “clear and unambiguous,” the 
Commissioner had interpreted the Code section “in a manner that is 
inconsistent with our holding herein.”50 Thus, the taxpayer was not liable 
for the negligence penalty when the IRS interpreted an IRC provision 
differently than the court.51 The court, however, does not go into any 
analysis of whether the taxpayer relied on the disputed Code section when 
preparing the return and did not require the taxpayer to show evidence of 
reliance when preparing the return.52 
More recently, in Pederson v. Comm’r, the court said “[I]n order to 
determine whether petitioners had substantial authority or a reasonable 
basis for the tax treatment of items related to their horse breeding 
activities, we reviewed a multitude of relevant authorities citied in this 
opinion and in the parties’ briefs.”53 The court further recognized the 
“substantial authority standard is an objective standard less stringent than 
the more-likely-than-not standard.”54 From this analysis, the court 
considered both the substantial authority and reasonable basis standards, 
with the substantial authority standard being a more stringent objective 
standard than the reasonable basis standard.55  Additionally, the court does 
not look to whether the taxpayer actually relied on the authorities in 
arguing a return position, but instead analyzed whether the return position 
could be supported by the authorities cited in the opinion and in the 
briefs.56 This suggests taxpayers may support their return position once the 
return is already filed without having actual reliance on the authorities 
when preparing the return.57 The court’s description of the reasonable 
basis standard directly correlates with the reasonable basis standard being 
objective.58 The court does not directly mention whether the taxpayer 
needed to rely on the authorities when contemplating tax decisions or 
 
48 See id.; see also FRIED, supra note 3. 
49 See Bunney, 114 T.C. at 267. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 Pederson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-54, at *58–59 (2013). 
54 Id. at *58 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (2019)). 
55 See id. at *58-59. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
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before filing the return, but goes directly into the analysis as to whether 
the taxpayer’s return position was supported by the relevant authorities.59 
In TIFD III-E Inc. v United States, the district court found the 
negligence penalty did not apply because the taxpayer had a reasonable 
basis; however, the Second Circuit reversed and said the authorities did 
not support the reasonable basis standard, but did not specifically address 
the district court’s analysis of the reasonable basis standard.60 The district 
court noted “both the negligence penalty and the substantial 
understatement penalty involve an objective analysis of relevant 
authorities.”61 Although this does not specifically address the reasonable 
basis standard, this further shows that the courts view other related 
standards through an objective lens.62 Further, the court noted the Joint 
Committee on Taxation has said ‘“the ‘reasonable basis’ standard will be 
satisfied, and a taxpayer cannot be found negligent, if its tax position has 
a 20% chance of success on the merits.”63 The court recognized that even 
if a taxpayer reaches the wrong conclusion, they can still act reasonably.64 
This must be true or else “there would be no such thing as a ‘reasonable 
but mistaken’ position, and every situation in which litigation leads to tax 
liability would support imposition of a tax penalty.”65 The court then 
continued that the “government essentially asks me to draw an adverse 
inference from the fact that TIFD did not waive the attorney-client 
privilege with respect to the tax advice it received, but instead attempted 
to win based on the state of the law alone.”66 Thus, the court recognized 
that a taxpayer should not have to waive attorney-client privileged 
information in order to raise the reasonable basis defense.67 
However, if courts view the reasonable basis defense objectively, 
there is no need for the court to examine priviledged information, because 
the court will simply evaluate the return position based on the authorities 
cited by the taxpayer.68 In many instances, for a taxpayer to show reliance 
on relevant authorities before the return is filed, the taxpayer will have to 
show conversations between the taxpayer and the attorney.69 The court 
 
59 See id. 
60 TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 148-52 (D. Conn. 2014); TFID 
III-E Inc. v. United States, 604 F. App’x 69, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2015). 
61 TIFD III-E Inc., 8 F. Supp.3d at 147. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. at 148. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 150-51. 
67 See id. 
 
68 See id. at 151. 
69 See id. 
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continued by saying the IRS’s “interpretation defies both common sense 
and the larger structure of the regulations governing penalties.”70 The court 
observed, “[i]n general, a review for reasonableness is an objective 
assessment, one that does not consider an individual’s actual state of 
mind.”71 The court continued by explaining that reading an actual reliance 
component into the reasonable basis standard would create overlap with 
the reasonable cause and good faith defense, which is meant to examine 
the taxpayer’s conduct.72 
B. Cases Applying Reasonable Basis Finding No Negligence 
In Taibo v. Comm’r, the court found “the question of whether 
petitioner had a reasonable basis for the nontaxability of his Johnston 
Island wages is to be evaluated as of . . . the day petitioner filed his 2000 
individual Federal income tax return.”73 Thus, the court did not look to 
whether the taxpayer consulted relevant authorities before filing the return, 
but instead looked at the relevant authorities in effect at the filing of the 
return.74 In this case, the Tax Court noted the IRS had not applied 
accuracy-related penalties to any other taxpayer litigating the same issue, 
and the taxpayer was relying on letters from the IRS saying that the 
regulations regarding the subject were current.75 The court observed the 
taxpayer could have a reasonable basis even though all the other cases 
litigating the issue had all gone against the taxpayer’s position.76 The court 
concluded by holding the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for his return 
position.77 
In Matthies v. Comm’r, the court found the taxpayer was not liable for 
the penalty of negligence because this was a case of first impression for 
the Tax Court. The court noted “the negligence penalty may not be 
appropriate where an issue to be resolved by the Court is one of first 
impression involving unclear statutory language.”78 Further, in a newer 
case decided after Wells Fargo & Co v. U.S., the Tax Court in Oakbrook 




72 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2020) (“The determination of whether a taxpayer 
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account all pertinent facts and circumstances.”). 
73 Taibo v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 181, at *7 (2004). 




78 Matthies v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 141, 154 (2010) (citing Bunney v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 
259, 266 (2000); Lemishow v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 110, 114 (1998); Hitchins v. Comm’r, 
103 T.C. 711, 719-20 (1994)). 
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disagreement among us on whether the contested regulation is valid, and 
that might also be some indication of the objective reasonableness of 
Oakbrook’s position.”79 In this case, the taxpayer was not liable for the 
negligence penalty because the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for relying 
on a private letter ruling in regards to setting up a conservation easement.80 
In Campbell v. Comm’r, the court found that a taxpayer had a reasonable 
basis for only part of the return position.81 The taxpayer based their 
argument on a footnote from a case that held adversely to the taxpayer’s 
position, and the court found that this argument did not rise to the level of 
reasonable basis.82 However, the court found that the taxpayer had a 
reasonable basis for excluding contingency fee payments as income 
because the case relied upon, which was overturned after the filing of the 
return, provided a reasonable basis for the taxpayer’s position.83  Again, 
even though the court did not directly address whether the taxpayer 
actually relied on the source when arriving at a return position, the court 
agreed with the taxpayer that a taxpayer’s return position should be 
evaluated by the authorities that existed at the time the return was filed.84 
The court did not require that the authorities be valid when determining a 
return position, which occurs prior to filing the return, but instead 
evaluated whether the case was good law on the date the return was 
actually filed.85 
C. Cases Applying Reasonable Basis with Reliance 
Component 
In Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States, the Government argued the 
taxpayer submitted “no evidence that anyone at BME was aware of the 
existence of that revenue ruling at the time the decision was made to ignore 
the clear language of the regulations and to use an artificial price rather 
than the actual retail price when computing BLET.”86 Further, the 
Government asserted ‘“[t]his failure leads to the obvious conclusion that 
BME did not rely on that ruling, but rather consciously chose to ignore 
applicable guidance.”87 In denying summary judgment for the taxpayer, 
 
79 Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1352, at *43-45 
(2020). 
80 Id. at *43-44. 
81 Campbell v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 20, 31 (2010). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 32. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States, No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103625, at *29 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2016) (“BLET” stands for black lung excise tax). 
87 Id. 
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the court noted the taxpayer might be able to prevail on reasonable basis, 
but also mentions “an issue of fact whether BME was aware and relied on 
Revenue Ruling 81-188 when it filed its tax returns during the relevant 
times at issue.”88  In later proceedings, the court concluded the taxpayer 
did not have a reasonable basis for their return position.89 The court began 
by saying the taxpayer “cannot assert that its own interpretation of 26 
U.S.C. § 4216(b) and related federal regulations can serve as a rational 
basis for its filings and return position for the years in question.”90 The 
court then analyzed whether the relevant authorities could support the 
taxpayer’s return position, and decided the stated authority did not provide 
a reasonable basis for the taxpayer’s position.91 The court, however, did 
not directly address the actual reliance portion mentioned in the earlier 
hearing, but instead looked at the relevant authorities and determined the 
taxpayer could not have formed a reasonable basis from those 
authorities.92 
In Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, the court 
said “[r]easonable basis requires reliance on legal authorities and not on 
opinions rendered by tax professionals.”93  However, when the court was 
describing the negligence penalty, the court noted that “[d]ue care is an 
objective standard by which the taxpayer must show that he acted as a 
reasonable and prudent person would act under similar circumstances.”94 
This creates some disconnect between the negligence penalty and the 
reasonable basis standard used as a defense to the negligence penalty.  In 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, the court said that while the overall 
statutory framework supports actual reliance, this may not be the case 
when looking at the negligence penalty with due care language.95 To 
determine whether the negligence penalty is applicable, courts examine 
the taxpayer’s actions objectively.96 Thus, if the courts apply the 
 
88 Id. 
89 Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 901, 908 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 
2019). 
90 Id. at 907. 
91 See id. at 908. 
92 Id. at 906–08. 
93 Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1013 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
94 Id. 
95 See id.; Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 957 F.3d 840, 853 (8th Cir. 2020). See 
generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1)(i) (2020); Treas. Reg. § 6404(f)(2)(A) (2020); 
Treas. Reg. § 6662(c) (2020). 
96 See Fidelity Int’l. Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 
49, 242 (D. Mass. 2010); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147 (D. 
Conn. 2014); Hansen v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006); Candyce Martin 
1999 Irrevocable Trust, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
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negligence penalty objectively, the courts should also apply the reasonable 
basis defense objectively.97 
D. The Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States Case 
1. Facts 
In 2002, Wells Fargo and Barclays Bank entered into a structured 
advantaged repackaged securities transaction (“STARS”), and as a result, 
Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits on its 2003 tax return.98 The 
purpose of claiming foreign-tax credits is to avoid paying taxes on the 
same income twice.99 The foreign-tax credit operates by allowing “a 
taxpayer to claim a dollar-for-dollar tax credit against its federal tax 
liability for taxes paid in another country.”100 Further, in order to claim the 
credit, the underlying transaction must not be a “sham transaction” and 
must have “economic substance outside of its tax consequences.”101 
First, it should be noted that the STARS transaction was described in 
the district court as “extraordinarily complicated—so complicated, in fact, 
that it almost defies comprehension by anyone (including a federal judge) 
who is not an expert in structured finance.”102 In this transaction, Wells 
Fargo placed $6.7 billion of income-producing assets into a Delaware trust 
and named another Wells Fargo entity (a U.K. resident for tax purposes) 
as trustee. Barclays then loaned Wells Fargo $1.25 billion for a five-year 
interest in the trust.103 Additionally, Wells Fargo would pay interest on the 
loan every month, and Barclays would send a fixed payment to Wells 
Fargo called “Bx.”104 It is well-established that STARS transactions have 
both a loan component and a trust component.105 Further, Barclays did not 
really receive funds from the trust because the trust distributions were 
placed in a “blocked account.”106 The funds were then reinvested into the 
trust and Barclays was able to claim a loss as a result of this transaction. 
From this transaction, Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits because of 
U.K. taxes paid as well as received Bx payments from Barclays, and 
 
97 See id. 
98 Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 842. 
99 Id. at 842-43. 
100 Id. 




105 Id. at 844. 
106 Id. 
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Barclays received a gain in the transaction from receiving the interest 
payments, while the IRS received nothing in taxes.107 
In the district court, the jury found the trust component of the 
transaction was a sham, but the loan component was not.108 Further, the 
court found the Bx payment constituted a tax benefit and Wells Fargo was 
subject to the negligence penalty under IRC § 6662(b)(1).109 The 
government asserted that “[b]ecause Wells Fargo did not submit any 
evidence that it subjectively based its return position on legal authority, 
the government submits that the district court correctly applied the 
negligence penalty.”110 However, Wells Fargo claims its return position 
just needed to be “objectively reasonable under the relevant legal 
authorities.”111 
2. The Holding on the Tax 
The Eighth Circuit held the “STARS’s trust component had no 
reasonable possibility of pre-tax profit, even assuming that Bx was pre-tax 
income to Wells Fargo.”112 In arriving at this holding, the Eighth Circuit 
analyzed whether the Bx payments and Wells Fargo’s payments of UK 
taxes were pre-tax income or a post-tax benefit.113 Looking at other similar 
cases regarding STARS transactions, the court noted that it does not matter 
how the Bx payment is classified because the taxpayer loses either way.114 
The court provided the example that “every $1 Wells Fargo makes via the 
Bx payments comes at the cost of $2 in U.K. taxes, to which Wells Fargo 
intentionally subjected itself.”115 The court concluded, “because Wells 
Fargo’s pre-tax expenses dwarf any income it receives from the trust in 
the form of Bx, STARS’s trust component simply has no reasonable 
possibility of profit outside of its tax features.”116 
In considering whether the payment of U.K. taxes was a pre-tax or 
post-tax expense, Wells Fargo cited several cases which the court rejected 
as applicable because the facts were distinguishable and those particular 
cases did not discuss STARS transactions.117 Further, the court noted that 
the “STARS’s trust component was essentially comprised of economically 
 
107 Id. at 844-45. 
108 Id. at 846. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 852. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 851. 




117 Id. at 849. 
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meaningless and circular cash flows.”118 The court recognized “this trust 
created no value for Wells Fargo outside of generating the foregoing 
transaction costs and expected tax benefits.”119 The court concluded that 
the jury did not err in finding that Wells Fargo did not have a valid business 
purpose in the STARS transaction.120 
3. The Holding on the Penalty 
The Eighth Circuit upheld the imposition of the negligence penalty in 
this case because Wells Fargo failed to actually rely on the relevant 
authority under the rational basis defense.121 The court began by looking 
at the plain language of the statute and the definition of the word “base.”122 
Under the majority’s analysis, “a taxpayer must show that it actually relied 
upon those authorities in forming its position.”123 Further, the court 
reasoned that “in order for a taxpayer to ‘base’ its position on relevant 
authority, it must have actually known about those authorities and actually 
relied upon them when forming its return position.”124 The court noted that 
when looking at whether the negligence penalty applied, at least part of 
the inquiry must be the taxpayer’s actual conduct and not just if the 
taxpayer’s position is supported by the relevant authorities.125  
Additionally, the court said, “[R]eading the phrase ‘reasonably based’ to 
require evidence of actual reliance is more consistent with the broader 
statutory and regulatory framework.”126 
Next, the court turned to addressing the three arguments set forth by 
Wells Fargo. First, Wells Fargo argued a plain reading of the text did not 
require evidence of actual reliance on the relevant authorities. In support 
of this argument, Wells Fargo points to other provisions where “actual 
reliance” is expressly required, and since “actual reliance” language is not 
present in the reasonable basis definition, the court should just objectively 
analyze whether Wells Fargo’s return position is reasonable under the 
relevant authorities.127 The court dismissed this argument as “contrary to 
 
118 Id. at 850. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 852. 
122 Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2020))). In this context, the court examined 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2020) and determined that under the reasonable basis 
defense, a taxpayer has to reasonably base their return position on one or more relevant 
authorities. Thus, this is why the court examines the definition of base instead of basis, 
because the word base appears in the explanation of the defense. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 852. 
125 Id. at 852-53. 
126 Id. at 853. 
127 Id. 
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a plain reading of the term ‘base’ and inconsistent with the broader 
statutory context.”128 Further, the court noted that just because other 
provisions create actual reliance through different language does not mean 
that actual reliance cannot be created through looking at the broader 
statutory context129 
Secondly, Wells Fargo argued the actual reliance standard would 
require the taxpayer to waive attorney client privilege in order to present 
evidence the taxpayer actually relied on the relevant authorities.130 In order 
for Wells Fargo to show actual reliance on the relevant authorities during 
the contemplation process for the tax decisions at issue, Wells Fargo 
would have to disclose confidential discussions with their attorneys to 
show relevant authorities were actually consulted during the decision-
making process.131 The court found that other defenses also required the 
taxpayer to waive attorney-client privilege, and this alone would not be 
enough for Wells Fargo to prevail on the negligence penalty.132 The Court 
said that this argument has some appeal, but by itself “is not a convincing 
reason to adopt Wells Fargo’s reading of the regulation.”133 
Thirdly, Wells Fargo argued that, as a policy matter, as long as a 
taxpayer gets to a reasonable position it does not matter if it is through 
“much deliberation” or “by sheer luck.”134  However, the court reasoned 
there “is a sound policy reason underlying a subjective or actual reliance 
requirement—it incentivizes taxpayers to actually conform to the requisite 
standard of care rather than simply taking the chance that there may be a 
reasonable basis for their underpayment of tax.”135 Further, the court 
concluded by saying that requiring evidence of actual reliance shows a 
taxpayer who contemplates the relevant authorities when forming a return 
position “is perhaps less blameworthy or culpable than a taxpayer which 
simply ignored the existing authorities in forming its tax position and 
attempts to generate a reasonable basis as a post-hoc justification for its 
underpayment.”136 
4. The Dissent 
Justice Grasz dissented, specifically opposing the majority opinion on 





131 See id. 
132 Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1)(i) (2020)). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 853-54. 
136 Id. at 854. 
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reliance.137  Justice Grasz began by arguing that the district court 
incorrectly applied Auer deference to the IRS’s interpretation of its own 
regulation.138 However, the majority does not use the same analysis as the 
district court in applying the negligence penalty.139 Justice Grasz also 
analyzed the plain language of the regulation, noting that “nowhere in this 
language, which is cast in objective terms, does the term ‘reliance’ 
appear.”140 Justice Grasz further noted a reliance element is specifically 
listed in other defenses, such as the reasonable cause and good faith 
defense.141 He argued if the “IRS wanted to require actual reliance on the 
specified authorities to satisfy the reasonable-basis defense, it could have 
expressly said so, as it did in setting forth eligibility for the reasonable-
belief defense.”142 Additionally, Justice Grasz emphasized that there is no 
language in 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) which “assumes the taxpayer must 
base its position on the specified authorities before the return in filed.”143 
Justice Grasz further stated it is the job of the agency or courts to determine 
whether a taxpayer has reasonable basis for the return, not for the taxpayer 
to show actual reliance.144 He recognized the district court failed to even 
consider if Wells Fargo’s return position had an objectively reasonable 
basis under the relevant authorities, leaving the possibility that Wells 
Fargo still might be unable to recover even if the defense were analyzed 
solely objectively.145 Although the court did not analyze whether the 
authorities cited would constitute a reasonable basis, Santander Holdings 
USA, Inc. v. United States addressed a different STARS transaction and 
determined that the taxpayer’s did not have a reasonable basis under the 
relevant authorities.146 
 
137 Id. at 855-56. 
138 Id. at 855. 
139 See id. at 856.  
140 Id. (looking mainly at Treas. Reg. § 1.666-3(b)(3), although he considers several other 
regulations as well). 






146 See Santander Holdings USA v. United States, No. 09-11043-GAO, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 118681, at *7 (D. Mass. July 17, 2018). 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. Post-Decision Application 
In looking at cases going forward, taxpayers may need to keep better 
records or documents showing they actually relied on relevant authorities 
when arriving at a return position. However, the Eighth Circuit is one of 
the only circuits requiring a taxpayer to prove actual reliance to have a 
reasonable basis. Other courts either do not discuss reliance or assume the 
reasonable basis standard is objective by going straight into analysis as to 
whether a taxpayer’s return position has a reasonable basis under the 
relevant authorities.147 Further, in many cases, the reasonable basis defense 
and the substantial authority standard are discussed together and are 
described as being very similar.148 Courts outside the Eighth Circuit imply 
the only difference between the two is that the substantial authority 
standard is more stringent than the reasonable basis standard.149 However, 
because of the Wells Fargo decision, the reasonable basis standard and the 
substantial authority standard are now very different. The reasonable basis 
standard now requires that the taxpayer show they actually relied on the 
relevant authorities when contemplating a transaction.150 This increases 
the burden on the taxpayer who must now clear another hurdle under the 
reasonable basis standard when contemplating tax decisions. The 
substantial authority standard is described as being an “objective 
standard,” and thus it would not require evidence the taxpayer actually 
relied on the relevant authorities.151 However, because of the Eighth 
Circuit’s opinion, the reasonable standard seems to shift toward more 
stringent, requiring the return position be supported by one or more 
relevant authorities and that the taxpayer consulted these authorities before 
filing the return.152  Further, this result would allow taxpayers with clear 
support, albeit not clear enough, to prevail on the merits, under relevant 
 
147 See, e.g., Pederson v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 54, *58-59 (2013); TIFD III-E Inc. 
v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 148-52 (D. Conn. 2014); Taibo v. Comm’r, 88 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 181, at *17-18 (2004); Oakbrook Land Holdings v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) *43 
(2020). 
148 See, e.g., Southgate Master Fund v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596, 665 (N.D. 
Texas 2009); Burditt v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1767, *38–41 (1999); Pederson, 54 
T.C.M. (CCH) at *58–59; Berger v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH), at *34 (1996). 
149 See Southgate Master Fund, LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Burditt, 117 T.C.M. (CCH) 
at *38–41; Pederson, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at *58–59. 
150 Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54. 
151 See Southgate Master Fund, LLC, 651 F. Supp.2d at 665; Burditt, 117 T.C.M. (CCH) 
at *38–41; Pederson, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at *58–59; Berger, T.C. Memo. 1996-76, at *34. 
152 Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54. 
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authorities for their position and to still be liable for the negligence penalty 
if the authority was not relied upon prior to the filing.153 
B. Is the Holding Correct? 
Even though the holding in ____  is persuasive, the overall statutory 
framework and prior case law do not explicitly support a subjective actual 
reliance component within the reasonable basis standard. Several courts 
do not directly discuss the reasonable basis standard but do describe the 
negligence standard as being objective.154 This shows that the courts 
determine whether the negligence penalty is applicable through an 
objective analysis, and thus one of the main defenses to the negligence 
penalty should also be viewed objectively.155 This conclusion is consistent 
with an objective reasonable basis standard since it provides a defense for 
the negligence penalty.156  Additionally, a review of the statutory 
framework supports the conclusion that courts should apply the reasonable 
basis standard objectively as many other similar standards are objectively 
applied as well.157 
The Eighth Circuit’s penalty holding revolves around the definition of 
the word “base,” in which the court chose one definition above all others 
to support the position that a taxpayer must have actual reliance on 
relevant authorities when contemplating tax decisions.158  For instance, the 
definition of base, as listed in Black’s Law Dictionary includes: “[t]o 
establish (an agreement, conclusion, etc.); to place on a foundation; to 
ground <the claim is based in tort.>.”159  From this definition, the court 
could have reached the completely opposite result. For instance, a return 
position can be grounded in authority, even though the taxpayer may not 
have consulted with the relevant authorities while completing the return or 
contemplating a tax decision. Further, in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC, 
 
153 See id. 
154 Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States., 747 F. Supp. 2d 49, 
242 (D. Mass. 2010); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147 (D. Conn. 
2014); Hansen v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006); Candyce Martin 1999 
Irrevocable Trust v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
155 See id. 
156 See Fidelity Int’l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 242; Mario J. 
Verdolini & Christopher A. Baratta, The Objectivity of the Reasonable Basis Defense to 
Tax Penalties, TAX NOTES (Jan. 20 2020), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/taxpractice/penalties/objectivity-reasonable-basis-defense-tax-
penalties/2020/02/10/2bqz0?highlight=verdolini (The authors present an alternative 
argument that the negligence standard and the reasonable basis standard can be 
distinguished even accepting the reasoning of the court.). 
157 See Verdolini & Baratta, supra note 156. 
158 Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54. 
159 Base, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
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which was decided after Wells Fargo, the court found that a taxpayer had 
a reasonable basis for a return position regarding conservation easements 
when the court itself had a disagreement about the meaning of a contested 
regulation.160 The court said, “Section 1.6662-3(b)(3), Income Tax Regs., 
tells us that a return position generally satisfies the reasonable-basis 
standard if it is based on, among other types of authorities, private letter 
rulings.”161 Here, the court also used the phrase “based on,” yet does not 
go into any detail about whether the taxpayer relied upon the language 
when forming a return position.162 This seems to suggest that the Tax Court 
may not impose the subjective requirement that has been added by a few 
courts.163 
Additionally, the court determined that “in light of the broader context 
of the statute,” actual reliance is a component of the reasonable basis 
defense.164 However, since courts often consider or describe the 
reasonable basis and the substantial authority standard together, the court 
should have taken into account that the substantial authority standard is 
plainly described as an “objective” standard.165 The courts in another line 
of cases concluded that, as a result of the substantial authority standard 
being met, the reasonable basis standard was also met.166 Under the 
reasoning in Wells Fargo & Co., a situation may arise where a return 
position meets the objective substantial authority standard, but fails the 
less strict reasonable basis standard because the actual reliance component 
is not met by the taxpayer. 
On one hand, the policy reasons set forth by the Eighth Circuit seem 
persuasive and will lead to taxpayers actually consulting authorities before 
making tax decisions.167 For example, the court said actual reliance 
“incentivizes taxpayers to actually conform to the requisite standard of 
care rather than simply taking the chance that there may be a reasonable 
basis for their underpayment of tax.”168 This requires that the taxpayer 
 
160 Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1352, at *43 (2020). 
161 Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii)). 
162 See id. 
163 See id.; Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853-54; Blue Mt. Energy, Inc. v. United 
States, No. 2:14-cv-418-DN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103625, at *26 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 
2016); Blue Mt. Energy v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 901, 906–08 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 
2019). 
164 Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 852. 
165 See Southgate Master Fund, LLC v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596, 665 (N.D. 
Texas 2009); Burditt v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1767, *38–41 (1999); Pederson v. 
Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 54, *58-59 (2013); Berger v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH), at 
*34 (1996). 
166 See Southgate Master Fund, LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 667; Burditt, 117 T.C.M. (CCH) 
at *40–41. 
167 Wells Fargo & Co., 957 F.3d at 853. 
168 Id. at 853-54. 
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actually consult authorities when performing transactions, and not just 
support its decision-making after the return has already been filed.169 On 
the other hand, this seems to suggest on some level that just showing the 
taxpayer read the authorities presents a good chance the taxpayer and the 
IRS will be in agreement on the interpretation of the relevant authorities.170 
This is clearly not the case since in Mortensen the court said, “[r]easonable 
minds can differ over tax reporting and sometimes the IRS disallows 
certain transactions.”171 The court continued by saying “[e]very time a 
transaction is challenged or disallowed, the taxpayer is not liable for 
penalties.”172 Thus, simply because the taxpayer holds to a position 
contrary to the IRS does not mean that the taxpayer negligently reached 
its return position or should be held liable because it did not actually rely 
on the authorities when arriving at a return position.173 
Further, much of the prior case law does not fully discuss whether the 
taxpayer actually relied on the relevant authorities. Instead, the cases either 
mention reasonable basis in passing or describe the definition of 
reasonable basis and then see if the relevant authorities provide support 
for the taxpayer’s return position. This may suggest that courts assume the 
taxpayer relied on the relevant authorities when completing their taxes. 
However, the more likely explanation is that the courts assume the 
reasonable basis standard is a solely objective standard and it is the 
position of the court to determine whether the taxpayer had a reasonable 
basis in the relevant authorities for its return position. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit incorrectly held that the reasonable basis standard 
requires the taxpayer actually rely on the relevant authorities when 
contemplating a transaction and filling out a tax return. Although the 
public policy arguments in favor of actual reliance are compelling, looking 
through the history and analysis of other courts application of the 
reasonable basis standard does not support the Eighth Circuit’s holding. A 
taxpayer should not have to show actual reliance, but instead the court 
should analyze the taxpayer’s return position to see if it is supported by 
the relevant authorities. Further, the Eighth Circuit’s holding could 
possibly shift the standards and generate considerable overlap with the 
reasonable cause and good faith defense. For these reasons, courts going 
 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 854. 
171 Mortensen v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 2006). 
172 Id. 
173 See id. 
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forward should continue to apply the reasonable basis standard in an 
objective manner. 
 
